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Abstract: Inability to reach global partnership for equitable development (one of the 
MDGs) and perils of international financial crisis have turned the attention of development 
economists to resilient growth paradigm. While several advanced countries apparently misunderstood 
resilience for increasingly protectionist, anti-globalist measures, majority of small open still developing 
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with viability of export-led growth paradigm for small open economies in the post-globalised world. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Millennium development goals were eight broadly set international 
development objectives established under the auspices of the United Nations back in 
2000. The last but not the least important among them aimed at setting a global 
partnership agenda for equitable and sustainable development of underprivileged, 
transitional, less developed parts of the world economy.  
Inability to reach Millennium development goals (along with the outbreak of 
international financial crisis) has turned the attention of development economists and 
advocates of MDG global partnership agenda for development to yet another grail – 
namely resilient growth paradigm. Prudential aspect of resilience aside, international 
economic dynamics seems to have quickly became increasingly protectionist, anti-
multilateral and often denying the four freedoms in not entirely opposed to off-
shoring, recently to the extent that both academic and business circles have adopted 
the term post-globalisation. Even though neoliberal agenda -guided by distorted 
reading of the so-called Washington consensus- proved to be utter failure and 
suffered evident and righteous fall from grace [Malovic, 2012], dangerous swift to the 
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other extreme appears to be equally disturbing and ultimately ill advised. Be that as it 
may, in a world of extreme income inequality, subpar or dried-out aggregate demand 
and race to the bottom in terms of simultaneous exporting efforts of all (and 
developing countries in particular), we could arguably ask ourselves to what degree is 
export-led growth strategy, still officially preached by the Bretton-Woods institutions 
and national policymakers alike, even viable for a small open economy in the post-
globalised world any more. That indeed, i.e. the retrospect and especially the prospect 
of export-led growth of a small open economy in the contemporary post-globalised 
world, constitutes the central subject of this chapter. 
The rest of the text is organised as follows: section 2 deals with basic export-led 
growth theory, its predecessor, its anatomy and amassed affirmative evidence of its 
success; section 3 pinpoints key weaknesses and unintended distortions of export-led 
growth strategy; section 4 offers policy relevant appraisal of usefulness of export-led 
growth approach in the post-globalised world and introduces some mending 
extensions crucial for small open economies to continue embracing it; finally in 
section 5 we go on to summarise the chief conclusions. 
 
2. Export-Led Growth Theory and Evidence 
 
It is beyond reasonable doubt that some of the greatest credits in respect to 
speed, extent and persistence of economic development through history are due to 
successes of international trade [Rodriguez-Rodrik, 2001]. Which ever the grass-roots 
of above average growth and relative advantage of small open economies may be, 
either productivity gained by superior technology [Ricardo-Torrens theory], superior 
availability of resources [Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuleson’s model], spatial (geographic) 
concentration [Krugman-Fujita-Venables, 2001], or institutions [Rodrik, 2000], 
[Levchenko, 2007], robust growth and rising income have invariably been tightly 
correlated with trade liberalisation and export performance [Daruich-Easterly-
Reshef,2016].   
Moreover, spectacular growth experience of “East-Asian Tigers” (Japan, S. 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore) and most recently China, coupled with their 
even more explosive export performance from early 1960s to 1990s inspired both 
multilateral institutions and many national policymakers to embrace export-led 
industrialisation strategy themselves. Even though correlation does not necessarily 
speak of causality, spectacular co-movement of export results and GDP p.c. in 2010, in 
spite of global financial meltdown and 2009 contraction of international trade, is by 
the same token hard to ignore, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Correlation of GDP p.c. and export performance in 96 countries 
 
              Source: [Daruich-Easterly-Reshef, 2016] 
 
Thus, export-led growth paradigm initially rose to prominence in the late 1970s, 
following the equally influential reign of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis (of declining 
terms of trade for developing countries with so-called primary products constituting 
the bulk of their export supply) and henceforth import-substitution growth strategies 
that dominated development policy thinking from early 1950s [Palley, 2003], [Palley, 
2011]. It came into being when international debts began accumulating after the first 
and second oil shocks during the 1970s, when effectiveness of import substitution in 
terms of real growth suddenly wasn’t enough any more: foreign exchange was badly 
needed in order to pay for almost fivefold increase of the oil price [Gereffi, 2013]. 
However, a bit more careful analysis of just what exactly constitutes export-led growth 
strategy among “East Asian Tigers”, proverbial champions of export-led 
industrialization, invariably invokes a lot of confusion and striking heterogeneity in 
their individual circumstances as well as policies adopted. For example, Japan nurtured 
fierce competition within their respective industries but coordinated joint invasion of 
foreign markets under the famous MITI, Korea and Taiwan deployed even more 
activist government intervention towards strengthening export sectors, while Hong 
Kong remained a poster-child of free market economy. South Korea and Japan grew 
amidst big self-sufficient corporate conglomerates (kor. chaebols, jap. keiretsu), whereas 
Taiwan and Singapore relied primarily on SMEs [Ito-Krueger, 1996], [Dornbusch, 
2000], [Perkins, 2001]. That notwithstanding, Yusuf (2001) synthesizes three main 
ingredients of macroeconomic climate in which South-East Asian export-led growth 
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miracle was born: 1) strong fundamentals encompassing stable and predictable 
business environment with low but positive inflation, prudent fiscal stance, 
competitive exchange rate policies, financial market development, efforts to minimize 
price distortions and optimize share and quality of human capital, 2) technocratic 
bureaucracy insulated from political pressures and therefore capable of conceiving and 
implementing long-run development strategy and 3) export-led growth strategy itself.  
Now, a distinction is in order between intrinsic conventional exports, which constitute 
necessary and integral part of growth, and export-led growth outbound trade. While 
former represents mathematical identity (after all every small country needs foreign 
exchange in order to pay for its imports), the latter is a deliberate and multiplicative 
outcome of adopting explicit industrial and trade policies to expand exports. Such 
government policies have ranged from but haven’t been limited to setting export 
performance targets and corporate quotas to be met, state-owned banks’ credit 
support or heavy initial investment in chosen champion sectors, generous tax, trade 
and cultivating incentives for export-oriented firms, all the way to repressing wages 
and labour rights to keep unit labour costs competitive enough and dumping goods in 
overseas markets [Lin-Lee-Huang, 1996, p.197], [Lim, 2014, p.11]. 
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that in many instances those first versions of 
export-led growth strategies (that by and large produced the most impressive results) 
rode on the wave of and heavily combined import-substitution industrialisation along 
the lines of infant-industry argument with officially or covertly proclaimed export 
targets. The strategy of fostering domestic manufacturing industry by discouraging or 
limiting imports of foreign final products is known as import-substituting 
industrialisation [Krugman-Obstfeld-Melitz, 2010]. Indeed, in the face of market 
failures (externalities), trade restrictions could in fact increase real GDP, although they 
are seldom the first-best means of doing so [Rodriguez-Rodrik, 2000, p. 267]. Thus, 
case studies show that export-led growth strategies have been carried out with 
vigorous government participation, well above merely preventing an anti-export bias 
[De Melo-Robinson, 1990], so that often times import substituting firms and 
industries at wide enough scale economies and competitiveness achieved, 
subsequently slipped into export promotion hubs.   
Evidence of success in export promotion thus far is in the end of the day an 
empirical issue. Alas, huge and numerous record of empirical research in retrospect 
appears to be somewhat ambiguous. Giles and Williams (2000), who reviewed most of 
econometric work studying relationship from exports to growth, differentiated the 
existing literature into three separate strands. Panel studies use cross-country 
correlation coefficients and overwhelmingly confirm export-led growth hypothesis, 
even after ex-post correction for spurious correlation problem (due to exports being 
constitutive part of GDP), notwithstanding the caveat that there may be a need for a 
minimum development threshold before statistically significant association could be 
detected. These concerns led to deployment of OLS based linear regression 
applications, as the second strand, which were nonetheless cross-country predicated. 
Some authors warned against endogeneity problems in such regressions, yet 
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simultaneous equation estimation principle typically didn’t change their findings. 
However, Giles and Williams (2000) report rejection of export-led growth paradigm in 
single country studies, with scattered disagreement for the same country from one 
study to the other. Finally, three quarters of time-series based studies in the last 
century utilise some variation of Granger causality test to check the export-led growth 
strategy success [Ibidem]. Nonetheless, same authors conclude that regardless of the 
VAR, ARMA or VECM methodology deployed, export-led growth outcomes 
captured by standard causality techniques usually lack robustness to either 
specification or method, hence, there is little agreement between results of time-series 
investigations of export-led growth [Giles-Williams, 2000, p.16]. 
Be that as it may, novel studies like Konstantakopoulou (2016), yet again put a 
seal of approval to export-led growth strategy in small open Southern European 
countries which entered the EU and more recently the Eurozone. After all, even for 
small open transition economies of Central and South-East Europe, that are still out 
of the E(M)U and that came about after dissolution of bigger states or trade blocks, 
export-led growth strategy has been the only relatively quick fix to counteract falling 
domestic consumption and domestic aggregate demand. 
Having said that, what may be the underlying reasons for still undeniably pretty 
ambiguous empirical results of testing the validity of export-led growth strategy?  The 
next section tackles potential weaknesses and distortions of export-led growth 
approach in practice of developing and transition economies. 
 
3. Weaknesses and Distortions of Export-Led Growth Approach 
 
First of all, from a Neo-Keynesian perspective, boosting growth by tapping 
foreign aggregate demand may produce a substitution effect in respect to domestic 
demand dynamics with zero sum or insufficient outcome for the aggregate growth. 
Moreover, if many or majority of developing countries increase export supply of fairly 
similar structure more or less at once, there will be terms of trade deterioration which 
may or may not bring about satisfactory rate of growth  [Johnson, 1955], [Palley, 
2003]. That said, it seems that export-led growth approach’s hidden weakness is that it 
works when followed by a handful of forerunners rather than being proven effective 
as the mainstream growth strategy [Lawrence-Weinstein, 1999].  
In addition, if primary products or more generally low value-added export 
constitute the bulk of overseas supply of small open developing economies, foreign 
aggregate demand of developed countries for such goods can hardly grow 
significantly, hence we face export displacement paradigm coupled with potential race 
to the bottom in export prices, along the lines of J. Bhagwati’s immiserising growth 
and its offsprings [Palley, 2003]. That said, Feenstra (2004, pp.343-348) formally 
demonstrates that immiserising growth need not occur only if foreign demand for 
imports is inelastic or growth reduces the output of the importables at fixed prices, 
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but also due to a sort of Rybczynski effect when the source of growth is factor-neutral 
technological progress in exportables industry.  
Furthermore, expanding export capacities often requires borrowing in foreign 
currency, a debt which may become formidably difficult to repay if international crises 
or other external shocks produce huge volatility of foreign demand as they 
occasionally do and simply render developing countries’ export capacity an excess one 
[Palley, 2003]. Therefore, export-led growth takes advantage of opportunities for 
international trade, but it also exposes national economy to ever more volatile external 
shocks [Lin-Lee-Huang, 1996, p. 218]  
More broadly, trade openness in practice does not exhibit decisively negative 
relationship with growth performance. For instance, initial level of openness as 
measured by export-to-GDP ratio was proved to had been immaterial to growth 
performance of Taiwan and Korea [Lin-Lee-Huang, 1996, p.199]. As Rodriguez and 
Rodrik (2001, p. 262) rightly observe, “(…) if there is an inverse relationship between 
trade barriers and economic growth, it’s not the one that immediately stands out from 
the data”. This is not to say that countries with lower policy-induced barriers to trade 
grow comparatively faster, caeteris paribus, but rather that economic development 
presupposes crucial and highly sensitive roles for the macroeconomic, ethical, natural 
and psychological environment that public policies are designed to generate, 
transform and/or preserve. In turn, path dependency of institutional and 
technological progress (or lack thereof) implies that trade liberalisation in wise and 
successful historical examples did not shy away from infant-industry argument, 
import-substitution components of overall export promotion strategies and occasional 
tweaking of internationally set rules of engagement [Malovic, 2012, passim].  
However, even when trade openness does impact growth significantly and 
positively, Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001, p.267) warn us that increasing exports or 
indeed growth rate does not necessarily enable higher welfare: trade policies can raise 
national welfare without altering the rate of growth or even slow down growth and 
still be welfare-improving. Yarborough and Yarborough (2000) underscore that 
balanced growth brings no improvement in welfare if it goes hand in hand with 
demographic explosion, just as welfare rise on account of swift population decrease 
may prove to be short lived. Cheap labour-intensive growth also may last only so long 
if it’s not enhanced by capital accumulation and climbing up the technology leather 
within maximum two political cycles [Malovic, 2012]. Beyond textbook examples of 
market failures and positive externalities in import-competing industries, Grossman 
and Helpman (1991) claim that even in endogenous growth setting with increasing or 
at least non-diminishing returns, where trade openness usually exerts considerable and 
positive impact on subsequent growth performance, temporary trade restrictions may 
be associated with higher growth if barriers promote technologically more advanced 
sectors in economy. In other words, trade openness promotes innovation and 
technological progress only if forces of relative advantage push economies resources 
towards sectors that achieve and generate further productivity advances. Moreover, 
Baldwin’s and Seghezza’s (1996) conclusion, drawing from their extensive cross-
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country study, suggests that trade openness influences growth solely via its impact on 
investment, however, openness positively affects investment across the board, quite 
regardless of the capital-to-labour ratio of their respective exports. That said, much 
more than trade barriers or wildly volatile transport costs as culprits, short- to 
medium-run terms of trade swings in small open economies are nowadays largely 
generated by deliberate nominal exchange rate management [Malovic, 2014*].  
Be that as it may, continuous technical progress may not be essential for the 
very impetus of initial growth, yet it is sine qua non for avoiding diminishing returns to 
kick in [Malovic, 2012]. Many authors are justifiably obsessed with improving export 
competitiveness through national branding and stricter quality control [Domazet, 
2016]. Nonetheless, if national economies aim above simple price competitiveness (of 
labour-intensive industries with at best neutral technological progress), national export 
competitiveness boils down to superior productivity of both exporting and import 
replacing sectors, or as P. Krugman famously asserted, productivity isn’t everything, 
but over a long term it is almost everything. Having said that, even though 
international competitiveness is usually reanimated and balance of payments 
adjustment initiated via tweaking of the exchange rate, it should be attained through 
structural adjustment and continuing increase in productivity rather than by never 
ending competitive devaluations [Malovic, 2012]. Alas, since we now seemingly know 
that trade liberalisation doesn’t influence productivity directly [Baldwin-Seghezza, 
1996], a closer retrospective look at East Asian growth miracle cum changes in 
industrial productivity apparently uncovers that exports might have played a wee 
smaller role in that achievement than generally perceived. Namely, another weakness 
of export-led growth approach stems from the fact that high productivity in certain 
industries sure enough leads to exports, while reverse causality from exports to 
productivity typically does not exist [Yusuf, 2001]. What’s more, Lawrence and 
Weinstein (1999) report that based on empirical analyses for Japan and Korea, imports 
tend to have stronger effect on productivity than exports do.  After all, dominant 
literature on export-led growth strategy over the last quarter of a century emphasized 
the drawbacks of picking the national winners or even the very ability of governments 
to carry out such export/led industrialisation, faced with rules of origin, intellectual 
property rights and some such regulation internationally enforced by the likes of 
WTO, EU etc.  In similar fashion, Krueger (2017) reminds us that imports create 
employment and enable competitiveness improvement too, which is why export-led 
industrialisation shouldn’t fall prey of an attempt to export everything at any cost and 
minimise imports, for then export promotion would end up just as unsustainable as 
broad range socialist style import substitution thoroughly criticised by Krugman, 
Obstfeld and Melitz (2010), inter alia. In a nutshell, low cost imports sustain jobs in 
export-oriented industries, whereas high cost imports signal inferior technology and 
subpar competitiveness of domestic output and ultimately export supply [Krueger, 
2017]. Indeed, De Melo and Robinson (1990) elegantly demonstrate that Marshallian 
externalities, which formalise the impact of export promotion on growth, arise not 
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only from exporting efforts, but even more forcefully from acquisition of technology 
embodied in imported capital equipment. 
Another potential distortion comes from the rent-seeking corruptible behaviour 
inherent to human nature, particularly in societies of weaker ethical and institutional 
fibre. Even though empirical research by and large confirms the view that policymaker 
should pursue an interventionist policy in order to coordinate private sector activities 
[Ibidem], it is to no avail if government officials given the task of setting it up lack 
vision, expertise or moral ground to deliver. There were examples of government 
officials who tried to come up with export promotion while dully following perplexing 
prescriptions of neoliberal doctrine, others devised clumsy and hard line protectionist 
policies with blatant ignorance of bilateral and international treaties their countries had 
long ago entered into, yet others were in reality busy generating rents for themselves 
or their political masters [Perkins, 2001]. 
Lastly, but not least important, export-led approach based on attracting labour-
intensive FDI that seek cheap workers as the destination’s key advantage (often times 
propped up with host country subsidising FDI as a sweetener or indeed the main 
course), in most instances pauperises the economy and with a “promising” time lag 
pushes it even deeper into economic backwardness [Lim, 2014].  
Finally, Daruich, Easterly and Reshef (2017, p.1), based on extensive empirical 
study of hyper-specialisation of exports, suggest that “(…) export performance 
depends, to a larger extent than previously appreciated” on forces outside reach of 
export promotion strategy and national industrial policies. 
 
4. Usefulness of Export-Led Growth Strategy and Mending  
    Extensions 
 
Even though export-led industrialisation strategy served well many developing 
or in the meantime developed economies over the last four decades or so, with 
spectacular export and growth rates, thereby lifting entire populations out of poverty 
[Lim, 2014], pinpointed weaknesses and distortions of the export-led approach 
inevitably question the usefulness and viability of the strategy in the present time.  
Oddly enough, despite the worldwide popularity and widespread application of 
export-led growth strategy, global economic growth has ominously slowed down (and 
particularly so in poorer developing countries), as broadly evident from Figure 2. 
Potential weaknesses of export-led strategy aside, there must be something 
exogenous which lately altered the effectiveness of the approach. Feenstra (2010) 
claims that production offshoring and globalisation of national economies have three 
crucial macroeconomic implications: a) increased and less predictable business cycle 
volatility, b) inherently controversial price determination, terms of trade and price 
competitiveness issues and c) impact on productivity. All of it invokes what J. 
Bhagwati (1998) called kaleidoscopic relative advantage, because firms geographically 
fragmentise production by choosing least-costly host country for each production and 
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assembling stage, so that such rapid movement of investment and activities across the 
world -for some chiefly in response to wage stripping- implies that one may posses 
hard-won advantage in foreign trade today only to lose it as soon as tomorrow 
[Feenstra, 2010].  
 
Figure 2: World GDP growth dynamics over the global adoption cycle of export-led growth strategy 
 
 
  Source: The World Bank and OECD 
 
Namely, back in the day, when now developed countries were industrialising 
themselves, industrial policy meant building self-sustained national supply chains at 
home, driven by belief that small open economies cannot become export competitive 
without broad and complete industrial base [Gereffi, 2013]. Today, however, nations 
industrialise by joining global supply chains for assembling final goods, providing 
tradable services or making specialised intermediate goods and other inputs. Actually, 
if we divide history of export-led approach in three phases, the first depicted by post 
WWII rise of Japan and Germany, the second being South-East Asian success, this 
third stage of export-led growth paradigm falls under the so called globalisation’s 
second unbundling, where we don’t face just spatial divisibility of production and final 
consumption, but also the hard reality that there can be no meaningful national 
growth strategy carried out with national resources any more: contemporary export-
led strategy is, whether we like it or not, a fragile and complex partnership of small 
open developing countries, transnational corporations and advanced economies 
[Baldwin, 2011], [Palley, 2011]. In other words, nations presently seek to industrialise 
by simply joining the bandwagon of already established but constantly evolving global 
supply chains, rather than (re)building their production capacities from scratch. This is 
arguably easier and cheaper, yet also more sinister at the same time, since extensive 
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global outsourcing, associated with the simplest forms of labour intensive export-led 
industrialisation, might have alarming corollaries for institutions development, 
technology & know-how absorption, external competitiveness and value-added in 
small open economies over the medium and longer run. Put simply, lower hanging 
fruits are easier to grab but equally likely to lose on account of cheaper and/or bigger 
competitor. Moreover, lowering unit labour costs under external pressures represses 
salaries and overall wage share in national income, uncovering now clearly visible 
trend of decoupling productivity growth from real wage dynamics, even though real 
wages should be determined by marginal productivity of labour. Thus, more and more 
of achieved increase in productivity is going to capital owners rather than to workers. 
Consequently rising inequality due to falling wage shares of national incomes have 
stirred up social strife, caused plummeting of private consumption and ultimately 
provoked unprecedented slackening and volatility of both national and global 
aggregate demand [Lim, 2014]. Hence the growing concern that economic gains of 
participation in global supply chains do not necessarily translate in secure employment 
and sustainable development, but may instead bring some measure of macroeconomic 
upgrading hand in hand with considerable deterioration of labour benefits and social 
welfare [Gereffi, 2013]. 
Furthermore, small open economies today arguably do not meet several either 
internal or external historical, political and/or economic conditions vital for success of 
the old style export-led growth industrialisation. First of all, export-led growth gained 
critical popularity if not literally came into being because import substitution strategies 
simply weren’t designed to earn enough foreign exchange imperatively needed for 
buying oil or repaying external debts accumulated after the first and second oil shock 
[Palley, 2011], [Gereffi, 2013]. Secondly, emergence of multinationals and globalisation 
phenomenon in absence of stricter WTO rules enabled impressive expansion of 
electronics and semiconductor industries among early champions of export-led 
growth strategy [Yusuf, 2010]. Thirdly, not even that would be sufficient if Japan at 
the onset, or Korea, Taiwan and H. Kong didn’t benefit from their strategic 
importance in the Cold War theatre. Fourthly, much of its economic miracle, East 
Asian tigers owe to endaka era, period of strong and further appreciating yen, which 
forced Japanese keiretsus to relocate labour-intensive stages of their production 
elsewhere on the continent [Lim, 2014].  
That said, due to aforementioned hyper-modular and spatially dislocated 
features of globalised production, contemporary international trade is generally (and 
especially so for higher-income economies) much more vibrant in intermediate goods 
than in final products. The implication being that sliced up multistage production 
processes scattered across different territories render traditional foreign trade statistics 
increasingly unreliable as a yardstick for policy making or effectiveness of export-led 
growth strategy for that matter. Significance of stark discrepancies between value-
added and conventional international trade measures becomes more readily apparent 
once one realizes they are compiled as well as published in gross terms, inclusive of 
raw materials, intermediate goods and alike, which are being double counted whenever 
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they cross customs border more than once [Malovic, 2013].  In addition, Kumritz and 
Quast (2017) report that in as much as global value chains offer a new way for 
developing countries to industrialise, low- and middle-income small open economies 
are still seldom situated in upstream activities, i.e. typically export less domestic value-
added, albeit both their share and the structure of their participation in international 
trade is rapidly converging to that of high income post-industrialised economies. 
Domestic value-added as well as foreign value-added content of intermediate tradables 
have been increasing at the expense of their opposite numbers in final goods, while 
returned domestic value-added has more than tripled from 1995-2011; unfortunately, 
much of the promising trend among developing countries is attributable to the dozen 
or so South-East Asian economies, while the rest of the developing world fares much 
worse and lags badly behind [Ibidem].  
In conclusion, modern flying geese paradigm is seeking for ways of faster 
upstream transition of small open economies within the global value chain, thereby 
hopefully enabling sustainable growth for majority of developing world based on 
technological rather than wage competitiveness. To that end, Santos, Ribeiro and 
Carvalho (2013) zoom on at formidable importance of product structure and 
destination of exports as opposed to extensive and unselective export-led growth fed 
by competitive depreciations of national currencies. Drawing from voluminous 
literature, they advise narrowing down number of export destinations and argue for 
trade with technologically advanced high-income countries, which obviously expedites 
the climb up the learning curve and quality ladder [Santos-Ribeiro-Carvalho, 2013], 
provided that exporting firms prove capable of surviving the all-encompassing WTO 
rules and regulations, furious quality competition and tough ecological prerequisites of 
penetrating such highly sophisticated markets [Malovic, 2014].   
Thus, even though export-led growth strategy has probably always been 
oversimplified and oversold [Palley, 2011], only recently that realisation has picked up 
as a consequence of two watershed moments: global financial crisis and the sheer 
magnitude and macroeconomic impact of alarming income inequality [Gereffi, 2013].  
Thereafter, everyone is painfully aware of the fact that export-led industrialisation in a 
post-globalised world may and often times does encounter difficulties, industrial 
policies are notoriously hard to set right, export promoting policies swiftly get imitated 
or nipped into a bud by rulings of the WTO, anti-dumping procedures and alike, while 
global demand stay shrank and deeply saturated by goods thrown at markets armed 
with traditional comparative costs advantage only.  In spite of the WTO rules 
explicitly disallowing many critical aspects of government interventions to restrict 
imports, expand export-oriented manufacturing and control the kind as well as 
frequency of foreign investment, there are still ways to go about export-led approach 
if equipped by sufficient knowledge, patience and subtlety in the realm of commercial 
law, policy sequencing or utilising non-trade barriers and covert government support 
[Perkins, 2001], [Rodrik, 2010]. 
However, inherited structure of industry and financial system of small open 
economies as well as profoundly transformed post-globalised international trade pillar 
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nowadays have considerable bearing on what mending extensions of traditional 
export-led approach may be in order to ascertain continuing success of the strategy at 
hand. Domestic consumption-driven growth may be the option for emerging giants 
like China, Brazil or even India, but certainly not for small open economies for lack of 
both big enough numbers and deep enough purses in autarkical consuming context. 
Import-substitution comeback, again, is unwise and unrealistic for the exact same 
reasons that sent tremor to export-led industrialisation approach, i.e. because of global 
value chain production and trade logic supplemented by the WTO or various trade 
integrations rulebooks, along with traditional shortcomings of larger scale import 
substituting programmes as outlined in Krugman, Obstfeld and Melitz (2010). 
Economic isolation would, of course, be even faster shortcut to serfdom, every bit as 
bad as non-selective obedient following of neoliberal doctrines which high-jacked the 
original J. Williamson’s Washington consensus. The only viable option remains the 
investment-led growth strategy, i.e. higher investment financed by greater domestic 
savings at first and foremost, which will have to be a principle source of sustainable 
resilient growth in the long term [Yusuf, 2010]. Over the long run, national savings are 
the utmost important and reliable ingredient of intended investment in export 
promotion strategy. In the absence of well-developed, deep and wide enough financial 
markets, investment should be predominantly based upon corporate profit retention 
and heavy reinvesting rather than on proverbially battered and bruised household 
savings. That notwithstanding, primary source of growth has to be capital 
accumulation, although total factor productivity and pushing export supply towards 
the technological frontier would have to assume a vital role in medium to long run.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Export-led growth strategy still remains the most promising recipe to emerge 
from almost 60 years of national development efforts. Nevertheless, export-led 
industrialisation in its traditional form has become untenable for plethora of economic 
– be they contextual (globalization), regulatory (WTO and regional trade blocs), 
distributional (drastic inequality of incomes and opportunities) or functional 
(outsourcing and hyper-modularity of off-shore production), as well as political 
reasons (rise of populist right wing movements & leaders and return of 
protectionism).  
Export-led growth strategy today has to be much more discrete, nuanced and 
knowledge/ingenuity based than it was before when it comes to trade and industrial 
policy mix, to rely less on obsolete or too expensive self-sufficient home capacities, 
but on precisely chosen higher value-added segments of global value chains and 
constant improvement of technological base for economic activity.  
For small open economies, the only promising path seems to be paved by 
domestic investment-led export promotion concentrated in higher income countries, 
rather than thus far practiced indiscriminate export maximisation, recently advised 
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domestic consumption growth or broader comeback of import substitution 
development strategy. 
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